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Abstract
In recent years, the work in engine control rooms (ECRs) onboard ships is becoming
increasingly demanding and complex due to growing presence of modern information
technology (IT) applications introduced in a problem-patching fashion. Previous stud-
ies about ECRs discussed the design issues associated with physical and cognitive
ergonomics and lack of regulatory support. This paper has re-examined a design case in
an ECR on a merchant ship and discussed the potential of a service-oriented architec-
tural approach to manage emerging unruly technologies and integrate distributed
resources in the maritime human-technology system. An EU project was introduced
to illustrate the value of this design approach. Confronted with the complexity issues
residing in a sociotechnical system like the ECR, this conceptual paper suggests a shift
of focus from patching individual problems locally to a holistic systems perspective on
the maritime eco-system development, which would likely require more collaborative
efforts of various maritime stakeholders in practice. Certain extent of mandatory
standardization for deploying and managing information systems is considered to be
critical in these collaborative endeavors.
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1 Background
Increasing introduction of advanced technologies into control rooms may improve
effectiveness and efficiency, but it could also bring significant challenge to the opera-
tors in supervisory tasks (Ivergård and Hunt 2009; Landauer 1995; Sheridan 2016).
While the challenges exist in other domains, this paper focuses on the engine control
room (ECR) onboard ships. A systematic research for the relevant literature regarding
the issues of ECR did not produce much published work in the area. Databases
including Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar were used to search for the
following combinations of keyword strings: Bhuman factor,^ Bengine control room,^
and Bship^ located within the title/abstract/keywords (Scopus) or topic (Web of Science
and Google Scholar) for the time period limited from 1990 to 2018 in Scopus and Web
of Science. The numbers of papers retrieved from these databases were 17, 2, and 50
(first 5 pages in Google Scholar) respectively. The inclusion criteria assessed whether
the papers had an exclusive concern about the work performed in the ECR and the main
emphasis on human factor issues associated with introduction of new technologies. In
addition to these three databases, we also searched the string of Bengine control room
human factors^ by using the Chalmers University’s library service and checked the first
20-retrieved recommended papers to see if there were any reports that were not indexed
by the other databases. After a close scrutiny of these results, the included relevant
research papers are from a few researchers like Lundh, Mallam, Wagner, and Lützhöft
(Andersson and Lützhöft 2007; Grundevik et al. 2009; Lundh et al. 2011; Mallam and
Lundh 2013, 2014, 2016; Wagner et al. 2008). The search results provide a very
important research foundation for this conceptual paper but they also suggest that there
is a scarcity of such work in maritime research regarding the ECR. This conceptual
paper is also based on the experience of a research group which includes former ship
engineers from a Swedish fleet. This section presents an overview of the issues.
1.1 Engine control room in the engine department
The main constituent of a modern ship engine department is the engine room (ER),
which contains various indispensable and also complex equipment and systems for ship
propulsion, power generation, and other necessary operations, such as main engines,
auxiliary engines, cooling water system, lubricating oil system, fuel system, com-
pressed air systems, drinking water systems, sewage system, bilge system, ballast
system, and boiler and firefighting systems. (van Dokkum 2013). The ECR is very
important to the engine department as the information hub. The automation monitoring,
problem diagnosis, and maintenance of these systems require dedicated engine officers
and operational personnel to perform various supervisory and engineering hands-on
tasks in the ECR (van Dokkum 2013).
Parker et al. (2002) claimed what shapes the maritime industry from other industries
is that much more stress and pressure from seafarers have been reported than other
work group work. From the operational perspective, the safety and efficiency depend
upon a coherent set of control centers, which suggests the importance of the control
room design (Lützhöft and Lundh 2009; Stanton et al. 2010). One big difference
between the bridge and ECR is that that bridge is manned all the time while the ECR
could be unmanned most of the time on modern ships, except some merchant,
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passenger ships (van Dokkum 2013). The actual work situation in ECRs is rather
demanding: previous studies have explored this confined space from different perspec-
tives, including task demands, interaction with various information systems, workload,
working hours, and physical environment (the extent to expose workers to hazardous
substances and situations for an enduring period, e.g., confined space, air temperature
and humidity, noise, vibrations) as well as organizational factors such as hierarchical
organizational structure and authoritarian leadership (Lundh et al. 2011; Lundh and
Rydstedt 2016; Orosa and Oliveira 2010; Stanton et al. 2010; Wagner et al. 2008).
When a critical alarm is set off, the engineers have to present themselves to the ECR
and quickly develop situation awareness (Endsley 2011; van Dokkum 2013). Work
pressure, fatigue, environmental factors, and long periods of time away from home
contribute to the psychosocial stresses (Hetherington et al. 2006). High degrees of
fatigue and stress reduce awareness, productivity, and lead to higher risk of making
mistakes (Håvold 2015; Trakada et al. 2007). What makes it even more error prone is
that there are full of displays and controls, a plethora of analogous and digital systems
in the ECR (see Fig. 1). In general, heterogeneous and distributed resources and tools
reveal the intrinsic complexity in the ECR.
1.2 The realities within the dynamic social-technical system
Fast advancing technologies have become a significant force in the workplace but
Bdisruptive technologies^ can result in significant impact (Bower and Christensen
1995). While the goal of maritime shipping remains to be transporting goods in a safe,
productive, and efficient way (Stopford 2009), there are considerable changes in the
work content and demands mainly due to rapid development in technology (Lundh and
Rydstedt 2016): In recent years, manufacturers and service providers in the shipping
domain have been constantly implementing digitalization and computerization to
Fig. 1 An ECR in a large modern cruise ship
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encapsulate and transfer the analog world to the digitalized world where the manipu-
lated target becomes intangible software. Digital supervisory systems with more
artificial intelligence and quicker responsiveness have been introduced to replace
analogous equipment; new types of tasks in monitoring and controlling have been
emerged for the ECR operators; all these changes contribute to the reduction in the
number of crew member meanwhile bring significant increase of workload for the
remaining crew without influencing much in hierarchical organizational structure
(Lundh and Rydstedt 2016; Mallam and Lundh 2013; Mårtensson 2006; Wagner
et al. 2008).
One prominent challenge of digitalization is information fragmentation (Lundh et al.
2011; Wagner et al. 2008)—the information is unprecedentedly distributed and
scattered on different vendor-specific monitoring devices and equipment considering
the types of services and size of governed data, waiting to be found, clicked, read,
memorized, compared, and analyzed by a human operator. The operators today must
spend more time remotely monitoring critical systems in ER with various digital
screens and displays (Lundh et al. 2011).Wagner et al. (2008) suggested that the
fragmented digital information structure used for system control can increase
vulnerability and operational risks at critical moments in the ECR. Lundh et al.
(2011) found that the operators can feel that they were drowned in the dispersed
information and there is a strong need to have an Binformation overview.^ Much
research has also addressed the similar problems of the cognitive overload that could
hinder the human agent from noticing the environment change and filtering out the
needed information (Kahneman 1973; Navon 1985). Automation usually functions
rather well in routine tasks but it would be of least assistance when the workload
becomes high in dealing with contingencies. That is the Birony of automation^
(Bainbridge 1983). The ECR has a predisposition of Birony of automation^: an ECR
could be unmanned most of the time, but if something unexpected occurred then the
workload could become high very quickly. The engineers would basically depend on
their knowledge and experience to identify the problem, interpret the alarms, and search
required information in order to solve the problem. Technology is great when it works
(Lützhöft 2004). When it does not, human errors might occur if there is any misinter-
pretation. For example, House and Place (2006)‘s report on the investigation of
Savannah Express ship accident concluded that the engineers failed to realize the
Bindicated tacho faults were not the root cause of the engine failure^ (p. 47) and
misinterpreted the relationship between the tacho alarms and the hydraulic pressure
alarms due to their insufficient understanding of the engine systems.
Human errors, or the problems of human fallibility (Reason 2000), are frequently
subject to individual factors, e.g., insufficient understanding in the case of Savanah
Express (House and Place 2006), instead of the system factors (Hancock 2013; Mosier
et al. 2001; Norman 1990; Skitka et al. 1999, 2000), e.g., the context in which the
operators work. The system factors are related to physical, social, and organizational
aspects (Lundh and Rydstedt 2016; Viktorelius 2017). Human errors cannot be totally
eradicated (Foord and Gulland 2006; Rasmussen et al. 1994) and we need to recognize
the limitation of training (Chavaillaz et al. 2016; Lundh et al. 2015; Sauer et al. 2015).
Physical, cognitive, and organizational ergonomics are all very important to the
sociotechnical systems, and this paper mainly looks at the issues in the ECR from
the eco-system’s perspectives. Constant emergence of novel information technology
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(IT) solutions, state-of-the-art technological artifacts, and advanced gadgets (Gentzsch
et al. 2016; Gubbi et al. 2013; Heilig and Voß 2016; Koga 2015; Lukas 2010; Man
et al. 2017) that aim to provide decision support paradoxically places more demands on
the practitioners (Lundh and Rydstedt 2016).
Here, we will re-examine a case in an ECR to illustrate how various display units
and ubiquitous interfaces onboard, expanding in numbers, functions, and complexity,
are influencing the engineers working performance. Wagner et al. (2008) conducted a
link analysis in an ECR to illustrate how an operator needs to take care of the various
signals and conduct manual tasks at different nodes (see Fig. 2).
The top drawing in Fig. 2 has used numbers to denote two outstanding places that
the operator frequently needs to be, B1^ for the engine alarm information display area
(also managing of the engine room equipment, start-up and shutdown, opening and
Fig. 2 A link analysis in a modern engine control room (Wagner et al. 2008)
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closing valves, etc.) and B2^ for the administration area. Their actual appearances are
presented in the bottom of the figure. The link analysis points out the inconsistencies in
placing of instrumentation pertaining to physical ergonomics (Lundh et al. 2011).
Wagner et al. (2008) found inconsistent issues in the alarm displays in the console.
Figure 3 presents the console of the alarm management system in the ECR with its
main alarm display at item 2. It also illustrates some other alarm displays pertaining to
other sub-systems distributed over the control console, which may or may not inte-
grated into the main alarm management system. For example, the displays of the
cooling system to monitor the temperature and pressure of the pumps and other
equipment have been integrated into the main control console. But the fuel oil purifier
to clean the medium of impurities and the ventilation system may have their own
specific control panels and designated displays; much information is not always visible
or consistent in a main alarm display; the presentations of various alarm indications
could be ambiguous and confusing (Lundh et al. 2011; Wagner et al. 2008).
In this shown case, there is no cross-platform overview with high consistency,
accessibility, readability, and discoverability. The distributed systems were wired in a
way that synergy of information integration and optimization is barely obvious. Such
design might bring cognitive challenges that can undermine the engineer’s perfor-
mance. This is a good example of how conventional platform-dependent, device-
dependent, and vendor-specific tech-development view could be clumsy without proper
considerations on the infrastructure. Original analogous systems have their advantages
to allow rapid information access and overview, and these should be well considered in
the digitalization process. What the control room most needs today is probably not
another digital service or function but a strategy to govern the information in order to
truly support information processing and decision-making.
1.3 Stagnant design methodology
Confronted with an evolving maritime sociotechnical system, the system design
methodology in the shipping domain does not seem to advance with time to accom-
modate the contextual change (Man et al. 2019). Recent research points out that design
work usually lacks a profound understanding of the type of work that is performed in
the ECR (Lundh 2014). In a sociotechnical system, work as done usually differs from
work as imagined (Hollnagel 2012). Although the necessity of considering human
factors in marine applications has been there for over four decades (Lützhöft and Lundh
Fig. 3 Alarms can be distributed over a control console in the ECR (Wagner et al. 2008)
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2009), the underlying technology-centric design approach remains to be dominant in
the industry. It requires the human operators to adapt their performance and behaviors
to the computer interfaces instead of considering how the actual working processes and
operations have changed and adapted in reality (Allen 2009).
In recent years, human-centered design methods (ISO 2010) have been heavily
developed and promoted in the human factor communities (Abras et al. 2004;
Endsley 2011; Maguire 2001). While there have been efforts to incorporate the
approach in engineering projects, they are primarily aiming at improving a standalone
product’s usefulness and usability without necessarily enhancing the overall system
performance (Mao et al. 2001). A fallacy of human-centered design is to Bgive users
what they want^ (Endsley 2011). As a consequence of the technological wave, various
digitalization solutions have been proposed to patch individual problems or needs.
Technological solutions have been introduced like placing Bnew cards^ on top of a
deck of Bold cards,^ making the working environment increasingly complex. For
instance, the authors’ previous ship studies (Man et al. 2018) on a merchant vessel
found that ad hoc screens and displays had been constantly mounted in the ECR to
address the engineers’ needs of being aware of the navigational situations (see Fig. 4).
A vendor’s IT solution might be efficient to address these concerns, but it is
fundamentally restrained in this complex eco-system. Within the ECR, there are several
work zones where a number of tasks or functions are performed (Wagner et al. 2008),
such as the administrative area, normal monitoring area, and critical situation monitor-
ing area. The development of the IT service used in these areas relies on different
manufacturers and vendors and it is largely technology and device dependent, which
inherently creates many technical barriers to develop the desired Binformation
overview.^ In addition, the introduction of new solutions can generate new Btechnology
integration^ problems (Wagner et al. 2008). Therefore, new solutions are needed to
solve the induced problem. The Bcheapest^ solution, figured out by the adaptive users,
could be attaching sticky note to the monitors, as it shows in Fig. 4.
For the industry, the designmethodology is rarely aiming at the eco-system in the ECR.
To keep Badding cards^ or focusing on in-house development seems to be a dominant
approach towardsmaritime digitalization. The situation is also subject to the contemporary
Fig. 4 New screens and displays are constantly added to the ECR to meet a certain need
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business models in the maritime domain where related stakeholders are usually concerned
about their own products, service design, and development. For service providers and
manufacturers, they sell off-the-shell products and services to provide solutions; for
service consumers, they buy another Bcard^ to place it among the other IT Bcards.^
Without an open and holistic infrastructure conforming to certain standards to exchange
information oriented for service design and development, the information optimization/
integration and harmonization of emerging technologies at whole engine department’s
level could be far-fetched. There is an increasing need to address the growing disparity
between the design philosophies (i.e., fragmented design solutions and de-emphasis of the
overall context) and emerging unruly technologies in the ECR.
1.4 Missing standards and regulatory support
In safety-critical industries, standards and mandatory regulations may address the
design issues. There is a plethora of general control room design knowledge pertaining
to information management and human element that may be applied to the ECR. For
example, in the nuclear or the offshore industries, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) Standard 11064-5 (ISO 2008) and/or International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard 964 (IEC 1989) have been implemented
to provide principles, requirements, and guidelines to support information presentation
and human machine interactions in design of control rooms. One instance is that ISO
11064 standard, as a process-oriented standard (Aas and Skramstad 2010), has been
used for design of the control room for the Norwegian petroleum industry (PSA 2002).
Its use in different phases of design (analysis, design, verification, etc.) in the offshore
industry has contributed to safe operations (such as minimizing the human errors by
employing the human-centered design approach or minimizing loss by intervene the
accident path with technical safety functions) (Kjellén 2007) as well as improved
working conditions (Aas and Skramstad 2010). However, large variations in the use
of the standard have also been observed, which suggests the need for further application
adaption and scope discussion (Aas and Skramstad 2010).
In the maritime domain, there is also an intricate system to stipulate safety-oriented
rules and standards in terms of ship construction and operations (Lundh 2010; Mallam
2014). The overall situation is that although technologies have been constantly intro-
duced to the ECR, the regulations to manage technologies and resources in their
working environment are much lagging behind. Existing maritime regulations give
little support to address the issues stated in previous sections in the ECR that concerns
about growing presence of IT from information integration and optimization’s perspec-
tive. The majority of the established guidelines, rules, and regulations, general or
specific, are not used in the ECR (Mallam and Lundh 2013; Wagner et al. 2008).
The mandatory regulations of IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) Chapter II-1 BConstruction - Subdivision and Stability, Machinery and
Electrical Installations^ (IMO 2009) highlights the technical specifications for equip-
ment installations while the non-mandatory SOLAS amendments (IMO 1998) only
focus on the environmental factors and occupational risks in the ER. There is a lack of
regulatory support from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), shipping’s
highest regulatory body, concerning ECR design and operations, e.g., the consider-
ations for information overview (Mallam and Lundh 2013).
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With the ECR becoming an increasingly important role as an information center to
the engine department, it is certainly necessary to set up clear goal-based standards
but current regulatory statements are equivocal and ambiguous (Mallam and Lundh
2013). They have placed little concerns on the Bsoft^ aspects like configurations
between human and technology, the system hierarchical considerations facilitating
information processing and understanding, and the inevitable space between work as
imaged and work as done. The incumbent goal-based regulations are limited to
provide Bresponsive^ strategic road maps that are needed on a global scale to cope
with the complexities residing in the emerging technological implementations and
disruptive innovations. Mallam and Lundh (2013) suggested that this shows an
Boverall lack of cohesiveness, organization and initiative^ (p. 524), revealing the
regulatory incapability to govern the increasing technological development activities
for human operators.
The vacuum space in the regulations (the lack of mandatory regulatory efforts about
governing information in an integrated system) leaves much to those manufacturers and
service providers to interpret by their own and partially result in the disparate but
intertwined eco-system in contemporary ECRs. Though there are some standards
developed by organizations with input from manufacturers, such as the Industry
Standard on Software Maintenance of Shipboard Equipment recently developed by
Comité International Radio-Maritime (CIRM) and Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO) (CIRM/BIMCO 2017), they are not mandatory or they do not
necessarily concern about interoperability from the perspective of the eco-system’s
development in the wave of digitalization. Many manufacturers and service providers,
particularly start-ups, are still largely developing their own standards for their own
standalone products. What they would normally prioritize is their own business and
technological innovation. One consequence is the gradual change of the overall context
in which technological services are ubiquitous but there are Binvisible walls^ which
prevent information from being optimized or integrated into an Boverview^ to inform
the machines’ status. As Lundh et al. (2011) described in their study, what the engineers
have in their workplace today is only Bfeedback merely as a change in digital numbers
and/or a change in colour on a graphic symbol on a screen^ (p. 389).
1.5 Summary
Section 1 has presented the background of ECRs and described various issues in the
context of emerging technologies. Heterogeneous products and services may be built or
owned by different vendors, manufacturers, and service providers, who may have
fundamentally different strategies in developing their own technology trees, in-house
technical standards, and implementation approaches (e.g., different programming lan-
guages, paradigms, middleware, and platforms). These stakeholders are not required to
develop compatible and interoperable services and it is normal for them to prioritize the
development of functionalities or features of the products for business purposes.
However, the design approach rarely concerns the human factors and the user experi-
ence of practitioners has been largely downplayed. The situation is not only wracked
with the technical hardship but also organizational factors, compounded by the regu-
latory vacuum which allows a Bwild^ growth of the intertwined eco-systems in the
ECRs.
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2 Architecture and service-oriented thinking
When we speak, it is not our knowledge of language that generates the sounds—but
without them, we could not communicate. Standardization is important if we concern
the interconnections between technologies and overarching eco-system. Although
standardization could bring negative impacts, e.g., prevent use of alternative technol-
ogies, stifle creativity, or lead to abuse of dominant position by over-powerful consor-
tia, its overall impact in modern industry is considered positive (ISUG 2002). But how
would this be related to our ECR problems? One way to look at this issue is that
standardization is necessary to tear down the technical barriers. With so many stake-
holders involved in the eco-system, it hinges on an architecture paradigm that can foster
collaboration and bridge the gap between the technology development and diverse
business needs. The architectural approach serves as an umbrella and service-oriented
architecture (SOA) is a useful reference model, which has not been practiced in the
ECR. An EU project is used to illustrate the value of this alternative design approach in
this section (EU 2015).
2.1 An architectural approach to the ECR
The nature of disparate functionality showed in the case in section 1.2 reflects the
distributed resources for design. If we regard required functionalities as services, then
digitalization is a process to add values in generated services (Stickdorn and Schneider
2016). Services in the ECR can be internally formulated, shaped, and presented on a
ship system (e.g., machinery data generated in the engine room) or externally created
and manipulated on a ship-shore system (e.g., big data calculation and intelligent
decision-making support). The technologization can shape a vast space for service
providers to innovate with value-added service offering (Stickdorn and Schneider
2016).
The point is not to limit the introduction of new generations of technology into the
ECR, but how to govern them from a global perspective. Different pieces of reliable
technological components are important but a strategy to govern the technology in
order to truly support decision-making is even more important. The ambition of the
governance of resources and functions in the ECR would require collective efforts from
many stakeholders, not just users but also involved service providers and manufac-
turers. Recent maritime research on physical ergonomics tried to incorporate human
factor principles and knowledge in the engineering process (Mallam et al. 2015, 2017a,
b). The idea of integrating participatory practices in design process is very enlightening
because both disciplines of participatory design and service design are value-laden,
sharing common structures including involvement techniques, cooperative approaches,
and emancipatory objectives (Holmlid 2009).
This conceptual paper proposes that the strategy to govern the technology is to have
a high-level infrastructural approach that supports scalability, interoperability, and
customized integration. Architecture is defined as Bfundamental concepts or properties
of a system in its environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the
principles of its design and evolution^ (ISO/IEC/IEEE 2007). The architecture of a
system is a metaphor, analogous to the architecture of a building (Perry and Wolf
1992). The architecture is about the structures of the system and behavior, including
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system elements, properties of the elements, and the relationship among them (Len
et al. 2003). It is concerned with usage, functionality, performance, resilience, reuse,
comprehensibility, economic and technological constraints and trade-offs, and esthetics
(Booch et al. 1999). Products are services, bringing values to the users. Architectural
thinking can provide holistic insights about how we should shape the products or
services within human factor concern, i.e., how we should incorporate computerization
into the ECR, how we can address the issues of decentralization, maintainability,
scalability, information, and function redundancy in a way that does not shrink the
space of flexibility and creativity (e.g., leaves out the details of internal implementation)
(Len et al. 2003). Dikmans and van Luttikhuizen (2012) deem that Bthe goal of
architecture is to translate the business strategy into appropriate guidelines for
standardisation and integration. It is a means to end, making sure that IT can fulfil
the business requirements^ (p. 20). One of the criteria for choosing a proper architec-
ture is to promote usability and post-deployment extendibility but at the same time,
minimize the cost and complexity (Microsoft 2009). Flexibility and adaptability are
always appreciated in constructing such a large system. Thus, it requires us to find a
way to address the integration and standardization requirements of various stakeholders
and offer a sustainable path of incorporating emerging technologies. Architecture itself
is not standardization, but serves as an approach to align IT development with business
needs by applying appropriate standards. The important concept is to Bbuild capabilities
(to prepare optimization and integration), not just fulfil immediate needs^ (Dikmans
and van Luttikhuizen 2012).
One can roughly use this metaphor to understand our advocated architectural
approach: if we do not have an App Store, then it would be difficult to manage endless
apps so that the user experience will suffer to some extent. Lundh and Rydstedt (2016)
contended that the issues associated with ECRs were simply not a problem of how
many more displays should be installed. It is a question of the underlying infrastructure
development about how we can harmonize heterogeneous technologies to support
supervisory control and rapid information access. The infrastructural development is
a key to allow information to be exchanged pertaining to service design. It would likely
facilitate the development of a collaborative environment where individual Bin-house^
development could be shifted to collaborative development. This could imply an
important pivot in the shipping domain’s design approach in which a holistic architec-
tural thinking on a global level should be appreciated. However, this is still largely an
uncharted territory or much less discussed in terms of maritime informatics (technical
point of view) and regulatory support (non-technical point of view).
A closed system such as the ECR seems to have less necessity to be that agile as it
might not be as dynamic as a bridge system per se. However, with more real-time IT
systems to be set up to build communications and interactions with the bridge (indi-
cated by Fig. 4) and shoreside facilities (e.g., the trend of moving towards autonomous
shipping), the whole engine department is likely to become an open system. The
problems in the ECR are not just about traditional man-machine system, e.g., design
of supervisory control systems (Sheridan 1992, 2002), but also query the relationship
between human, technology, and organization (HTO) (Karltun et al. 2017) as well as
the work in the future (Karltun et al. 2017; Stanton et al. 2017; Vicente 1999). The
central idea is that, in order to surmount barriers that exist in technical level and
organizational level, the maritime design thinking has to go beyond the development
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of a standalone function and recognizes the importance of harmonizing increasing
presence of services via systematic integration and standardization. Service-oriented
architecture (SOA), an emerging way of thinking in contemporary architectural design
(Josuttis 2007), provides great advantages in scaffolding distributed heterogeneous
services for higher availability, accessibility, reusability, composability, and
discoverability and embraces the cross-platform standards (Dikmans and van
Luttikhuizen 2012; Seth et al. 2013; Stickdorn and Schneider 2016). Although itself
alone might be insufficient to address all issues regarding HTO, it is a plausible solution
to suggest the way forward by breaking the bottleneck of information optimization and
allowing the eco-system to scale itself in a more naturalistic manner.
2.2 SOA as a reference model
Confronted with the challenges deeply rooted in the whole eco-system, we propose to
use SOA as a reference model to illustrate how an architectural approach could be
useful in dealing with unruly technologies. Before more critically examining SOA, it is
important to perceive it as an architectural style, which Bdefines a family of systems in
terms of a pattern of structural organization, determines the vocabulary of components
and connectors that can be used in instances of that style, together with a set of
constraints on how they can be combined^ (Garlan and Shaw 1994). The focus in
the ecological system of an ECR should not be anchored to a desired feature, but the
principles to govern endless functions and information in a decision-support manner.
What we need is a paradigm to describe the framework of solutions for a set of
problems (Crumlish and Malone 2009). This is exactly where SOA’s efficacy lies.
Service-oriented thinking serves as the core, which is not only concerned with
operational functions in IT landscape, but also deals with business-aligned enterprise
services in the semantics of an enterprise architecture (Rosen et al. 2008). It is ideally fit
for an organization that has to frequently handle Bregulatory changes, fast-changing
demands, markets, and legacy systems^ and stay Bagile, flexible, and efficient^
(Dikmans and van Luttikhuizen 2012), but how exactly would SOA be used to
harmonize the ecological complexity in the ECR? There are intertwined internal and
external services deployed in the ECR. The service providers could either be manu-
facturers or companies generating intelligent services aiming at improved system
performance, and the service consumers could be IT technicians who integrate services
and develop customized solutions or the end users like ship engineers. From a
function’s level, a service can have three different components: interface (how a
consumer uses or access a service), contract (service content, quality, policies, context
in which the services will be provided), and detailed implementation (Dikmans and van
Luttikhuizen 2012). The idea of SOA is to enumerate Bfunctions^ as services, organize
them into logic domains, and try to be agile and efficient in resource-reuse (Daigneau
2012). In order to minimize the effect of modification, it is important to design services
as tiny manageable pieces with a clear set of capabilities (Dikmans and van
Luttikhuizen 2012; Josuttis 2007). This is a process-oriented characteristic in SOA
implementation (Havey 2008).
Operationally, SOA means to expose the interfaces and contracts in an open service
registry (similar to a Byellow book^) hosted on a digital platform to the service
consumers (in most cases the IT technicians) for reuse and integration, but not the
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implementation details of the concrete service data (Seth et al. 2013). Web services are
the key enablers of the SOAwhich are essentially a set of open standards and protocols,
such as REST (representational state transfer), SOAP, WSDL, and XML (Daigneau
2012; Dikmans and van Luttikhuizen 2012; Rosen et al. 2008). To overcome the
technical barriers, it is important to expose the service interfaces and contracts in a
service registry to enable cross-platform communication between distributed systems
with different owners, vendors, and manufacturers (Josuttis 2007). The open standards
embodied by the web services provide the common vocabulary for services to be
interoperable, integrable, and adaptable, but on the other hand, protect the business
value of the service providers by hiding the underlying technical complexity and details
(Dikmans and van Luttikhuizen 2012). Essentially, standardization is an inherent notion
in the SOA reference model. It enables interoperability and information exchange while
not limiting flexibility, empowering participatory cross-organizational design and de-
velopment aiming for improved user experience and system resilience. By leverage, the
power of web services, the back-end of the eco-system could be moving towards a
collaborative platform—to allow multiple stakeholders to not only dissolve the techni-
cal barriers by developing services that are characterized with interoperability, agility,
and flexibility, but also to develop a business synergy, to form the industrial symbiosis,
to really focus on the value-added service development for end users.
There can be numerous business cases to be developed to better exploit the
advantage of information technologies under SOA. One relevant instance is the
Maritime Connectivity Platform (MCP, formerly known as Maritime Cloud) developed
in the EU project BEfficienSea 2^ (EU 2015) in the e-navigation framework—an
ongoing development concept addressing the need to use electronic means to harmo-
nize Bcollection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine information
on board and ashore, enhance navigation, and related services for safety and security at
sea^ (IMO 2014a). The development of e-navigation solutions, to a large degree,
depends on the infrastructure of the MCP or Maritime Cloud (DMA 2016b), whose
intention is to utilize SOA to connect all maritime stakeholders for information
exchange (DMA 2016a).
Figure 5 presents how the MCP is utilizing the concept of SOA. Today, many
services are provided by different manufacturers or service providers for different
stakeholders, such as navigation, reporting, weather information, and port information.
A start-up company X specializing in big data computation can integrate the intrinsic
information services provided by radar manufacturers Y and shore-based meteorolog-
ical information provided by service provider Z to provide an intelligent decision
support on energy-efficient route planning for less fuel consumption. New manufac-
turers could also sail in the market with their featured integrated services; the devel-
opment in the back-end is going to be value and business oriented rather than a vendor-
dependent process, e.g., the consumers do not have to account for the changes that the
service owner wants to make.
Although the MCP is ad hoc for ship bridges, the engine and bridge departments
share the same problem that growing technologies need to be managed on a higher
level in the infrastructure. A difference between these two departments is that the
navigational equipment used in the bridge department is highly regulated and newly
added IT systems may only be used as the optional back bridge solutions, while the
ECR does not really have that mandatory regulations how we introduce new IT
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solutions. The navigators would probably be more efficient to develop their situation
awareness when looking the outside through the windows, compared to the engineers
who must rely on digital information on distributed displays to diagnose what causes an
alarm. This difference might create more needs for the ECR to consider using MCP to
integrate information, manage technologies, and shape the eco-system. In the back-
ground section, we have presented the reality by re-examining a case in the ECR—the
developed and deployed distributed systems have made presentations of various alarm
indications ambiguous and confusing for the engineers. The key to obtain a cross-
platform overview with high consistency, accessibility, readability, and discoverability
lies in the interoperability that requires both service-oriented developments from
service providers’ side and easy access to standardization application from the service
consumers’ side. With SOA implemented on the platform of the MCP, the hierarchical
structure of standards will provide ship owner possibilities to integrate and optimize
information without bothering about the implementation details from service providers.
With the introduction of the MCP, service providers and manufacturers can also
separate core functionalities development from interface design and standardization
establishment, fundamentally improving interoperability of the systems in the ECR.
The MCP directly concerns the development work in the back-end, i.e., how we
manage unruly technologies with design, deployment, and governance of standardiza-
tion. However, such efforts done in the back-end have always aimed to create gains in
the front-end—an improved user experience for the goals of safety and efficiency. For
example, from the design and implementation perspective, the establishment of the
MCP would allow a desired overview to be better aligned with the physical and
cognitive ergonomics principles. Table 1 summarizes the benefit synthesis for both
back-end and front-end users in the context of the MCP.
Beside the benefits that are grounded in the technical aspects, SOA could be used for
organizing and utilizing capabilities that may be under the control of different owner-
ship domains (OASIS 2006), as shown in the stakeholder map of Fig. 5. It could enable
different companies to independently implement services that meet their immediate
Fig. 5 Maritime Connectivity Platform (Maritime Cloud) using SOA to connect different stakeholders and
integrate distribute resources (DMA 2016a)
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needs, yet it can be also combined into higher level business processes and enterprise
solutions (Rosen et al. 2008). This might be applicable for various regulatory bodies
and high-level policy makers. In a latest workshop of the MCP, the participated
maritime stakeholders of interest concluded that Bthe MCP is expected to take down
barriers of language and communication, it will be a platform for new business
opportunities. The strengths are the introduction of standards, inter-operability and
the support of international associations^ (Doyle and Ward 2017). The goal is to create
an infrastructure in the maritime domain to enable information exchange and optimi-
zation, which in the end would influence safety, productiveness, and efficiency of
system performance and even the whole ecology.
Confronted with the problems identified in the work situation on board, little
suggestions on solutions have been proposed up to now. In the shipping domain, what
we commonly see is the advocation of human-centered design approach for individual
system design and development (Abeysiriwardhane et al. 2016; Costa et al. 2017) or
the strategy of development around the bridge (IMO 2014b), but they do not neces-
sarily address the complexity in the ECR eco-system. This architectural thinking behind
the MCP provides an alternative path to approach system engineering: How legacy
systems could remain in use while the introduction of new systems could be compatible
with existing functions? How novel IT solutions should be developed and deployed
with more human factor concerns? How heterogeneous and distributed information can
be interoperable and presented to support the operators to quickly understand situations
and make decisions? SOA creates a vast space of opportunities to tackle with these
questions in the ECR. The prioritization of Barchitecture^ of the system reveals a
different mind-set to deal with increasing IT requirements compared to a common
solution of mechanically setting up new screens and monitors. It is believed that this
will create value not only for the sharp front-end users who interact and operate in the
Table 1 SOA’s benefit synthesis for back-end and front-end users in the context of the MCP
Back-end users: Front-end users:
Service providers, manufacturers Engineers, navigators
Flexibility and
agility in
service
development
Smaller blocks of services with agile
development that enables the engineering
life cycle to be more responsive to the
market and needs
Possibility to have customized features
that can meet various Btrivial^ needs
Function and
information
reuse
Could focus on the core business
development and quality of the service.
This can lead to shorter time in
development, maintenance, and marketing
with cost reduction
Avoid confusions in using similar
functions or information provided by
different manufacturers or service
providers
Standardizations
via web
services
The collaborative space could hide technical
details but expose interfaces to enable
interoperability on various platforms and
loose-coupling services in implementation
phase, thus the proprietary services have
better maintainability while customized
information integration/optimization be-
comes viable at a certain stage
Less workload for searching and
accessing distributed fragmented
information as information can
become more integrated/optimized
and supportive
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field but also the blunt back-end maritime authorities and policy makers who design
strategies and set up regulations. The impact of standardization to shape the eco-system
for sustainable technology innovations catered for the user’s needs should not be
underestimated.
3 Theoretical reflections: drifting into failures
One important design goal for any complex high-risk human-technology system should
be enhancing the system’s capability to maintain in the safety boundary in the
Bincubation period^—a period in which the incremental changes that may later con-
tribute to a system-wide collapse got unnoticed (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014; Turner
1978). Proactive adaptation of the interface to support monitoring (Mumaw et al. 2000)
or the Binformation overview^ feature we mentioned earlier (Lundh et al. 2011; Wagner
et al. 2008) could be two useful cognitive instrument to support operators to respond
flexibly in an increased margin of maneuverability, but we argue that a more important
thing for design is to take a systems perspective to understand the eco-system’s
complexity. Flach (2011) has characterized this Bcomplexity^ as dimensionality of
the problem space (i.e., the size of the variables) and interactions between dimensions.
With the un-eliminated legacy systems and rapid development of model IT systems,
data, the oil of the digital era, is generated ubiquitously. The growing internal interac-
tions and evolving external interactions that aim to extract the value out of data reveal
the high volume of varieties of the world. The critical thing for the blunt-end is to
consider how to shape the system’s capability in dealing with complexity—ability to
have adaptable reserves and flexibility to accommodate the unforeseen contingencies
(Mikkers 2010; Nemeth 2008). This is beyond the idea of using design to address
individual limitations, but is about making the whole system more resilient. Resilience
is about having adaptability and flexibility in the system (Hollnagel 2013). This would
require various stakeholders (e.g., IT practitioners, service providers, manufacturers,
regulatory bodies, and other organizations) in the shipping industry to posit the
digitalization and innovation development view on holistic and sustainable terms.
One prominent need is to have that adaptability and flexibility coming from the
aforementioned booming unruly technologies, both in size and complexity, spreading
around the whole workplace, contributing to in-transparency in the controlled process,
and gradually shifting the system from a closed one to an open one. By having more
Bcards^ or technological solutions on the table, we may have more flexibilities inherent
in the technical artifacts themselves, but they may create new layers of complexities
(Woods 1993) and continually require operators to adapt in high-risk work (Rankin
et al. 2014). Woods (1993) explained that this is because Bthe technological flexibilities
that simply create burdens on the practitioners^ could prevail over Bthe technological
flexibilities that are used to increase the range of practitioner adaptive response to the
variability resident in the field of activity^ (p. 19). We should not ignore the essential
role of performance variability in pursuit of system’s resilience—human should no
longer be seen as hazards to the system (Dekker 2004; Hollnagel 2009). Within a
system that constantly experience changes, an organization could be deemed as a set of
changing adaptive processes or sub-systems (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014; Leveson
2011). It is critical that the fundamental settings of the system (i.e., architecture) can
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increase the safety margin and support the diverse use and functions (so that the
operators with imperfect knowledge to stay responsive to various constraints in the
context). The architectural understanding of the whole system aims to recognize the
adaptability and support the performance variability with a holistic thinking rather than
blindly introducing immediate solutions to fix Bpatches.^ The focus of complex system
design should not be on the scrutiny of individual components in a manner attempting
to meeting new requirements by adding more Bcards^ (e.g., features, functionalities
with new layers/generations of technology). Dekker (2011) contended that a deeper
understanding of the system must go beyond hunting the component that went wrong.
Instead, the focus should be the Bwebs of relationships,^ the global structure and
environment because they will likely shape the organization’s capability to accommo-
date and allow human adaptation effectively to the complexities (Dekker and
Pruchnicki 2014; Woods 2003).
It is worth pointing out that adaptations cannot only be viewed from the sharp-end
practitioners (Rankin et al. 2014) but also the blunt-end designers, regulators, policy
makers, and even the whole regulatory bodies, who set the goal-based standards for
achieving safety and efficiency but provide limited regulatory support in what and how
(Mallam and Lundh 2013). Researchers have kept mentioning the problems in ECRs
but still there are few concrete solutions being proposed. We believe the considerations
on the fundamental structure or the architecture of the system, even from a technical
point of view as a starting point, is essential to provide a way forward to address the
issue onboard that is characterized of these emerging unruly technologies. It is impor-
tant to shift our focus only from patching individual problems locally to a holistic
architectural thinking regarding the maritime eco-system development. Shipping is a
highly technology-driven but also conservative domain with many stakeholders. When
confronted with a problem, most rational decisions were made locally by the actors
involved. Rationality is certainly not a bad thing. Setting up new screens or new
systems are decisions based on rational thinking and demands. From the perspective
of complexity, the problem is that local adaptiveness can lead to Billusion of assistance^
or Bmis-calibration^ of the dynamic situation, as it might lead the regulators and policy
makers to ignore the mal-adaptiveness on a global scale (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014).
This is worrisome when considering the technology is growing so rapidly across
industries in modern society. Computing power has doubled more than 27 times since
the birth of the integrated circuit in 1958 and the globalization has been making the
world more connected than ever (Ford 2015). The unlimited possibilities and general
success today we see in the IT development across all transportation sectors do not
mean such a direct way of introducing digitalization and value-added services are
immune to risks. If the technological components or the retrofitting work on legacy
systems are not monitored and regulated with a holistic thinking (e.g., overall system
structures, inter-connected relationships, and standardization requirements for interop-
erability), the technologies would not be harmonized in the infrastructure, then the risks
could be accumulated, proliferated, and promulgated without notice (i.e., slowly drift
into failure) until at some point we find that our workplace is full of system Bchaos.^
These Bchaos^ may result in more and more work demands on workers described
earlier, likely leading to more human errors.
The architectural thinking in this conceptual paper is not about meddling how tech-
nologies are implemented in detail for meeting new requirements. It is concerned about the
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need of introducing necessary standardization to allow a more efficient and sustainable
system to be developed. Standardization, as an inherent notion in the architectural
approach, which plausibly limits the possibilities of being versatile and flexible, is
essentially building this new kind of Borganisational monitoring and learning^ (p. 541)
that the system needs to stay in the safety boundary (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014). For
instance, SOA has the potential to build the vocabulary to harness the complexity in the
intricate eco-system by incorporating standardization and paradigm thinking in adaptive,
global, and dynamic terms. The MCP, as one example implementing SOA, takes advan-
tage of standardization and aims to shape a collaborative space to allow various stake-
holders to concentrate on their own business-aligned value-added service development
and quality enhancement cost efficiently. Will standardization hinder technological ad-
vancement and innovations?Not necessarily. For example, the standardization in theMCP
solution is implemented in a hierarchical way, from service specification (higher level), to
design and instance (lower-level) (DMA 2016b). It means the degree of standardization
could vary depending on the business needs. The higher level standards identification and
coordination needs to be carried out among standards organizations, such as IMO, ITU
Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R), International Hydrographic Organization (IHO),
ISO, IEC, International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities (IALA), European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Adminis-
trations (CEPT), and European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and their
relevant committees as well as working groups (IALA 2016). Without the support from
these regulatory bodies and standards organizations, the benefits of an architectural
approach to manage technologies in the ECR could be limited. The point this paper wants
to make is that we need to have a fundamental infrastructure in the shipping domain to
enhance sustainable technology development. The App Store works successfully not
because of one or two killer apps, but because of its robust eco-system that allows more
innovative apps to be developed, published, searched, and used—something that our
maritime industry may need to reflect upon in the digital age. As more IT solutions being
introduced onboard or onshore (e.g., big data applications, cloud computing services,
block-chain applications, virtual reality, and augmented reality applications), the necessity
of governing technologies has never been more important. Without the concerns on the
infrastructure and standardization, the regulatory support would be difficult to keep up the
pace with technological progress that the shipping industry is making. Like the paradox
mentioned by Dekker and Pruchnicki (2014) that Borganizations fail because they are
successful,^ we also have something to grapple with for a complex sociotechnical system
like an ECR: Bflexibilities succeed because they are standardized.^ This chimes with our
rhetoric put earlier—the concern is never to limit the development of technological
advancement but manage the eco-system in the long perspective.
4 Conclusions
Engine control rooms (ECRs) have been characterized of growing presence of IT
applications, which makes the work environment increasingly complex. This paper
has proposed to shift the focus from patching individual problems by continuously
introducing more and more so-called intelligent artifacts to a holistic thinking with a
service-oriented architectural view. Certain degree of standardization is considered as a
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prerequisite to allow technologies to be better integrated and governed in the back-end,
which is tightly associated with the user experience and safety performance in the front
end. The trickle-down regulations in the maritime domain must consider the configu-
rations between the human workers and the emerging technologies to address the
increasing complexity onboard. Without holistic systems thinking on a global scale,
whatever tech-innovations we introduce to the workplace today will likely become
unruly technologies, which would eventually erode the adaptive capacity of the man-
machine system (Patterson et al. 2007) and compromise safety and efficiency.
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